Hackers used a vulnerability in Optimizely to deliver cryptocurrency-stealing malware through websites linked to at least 178 organizations on November 16, 2026, including IKEA, HSBC, Heineken, Air France-KLM and hardware wallet manufacturer Ledger.
The campaign, known as OPTIMJACK, also affected CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab. Its malicious code targeted cryptocurrency transfers, payment card information and potentially vulnerable iPhones.
According to security researcher Scott Helme’s investigation at Report URI, his team examined 1,611 Optimizely JavaScript files and identified 188 infected scripts associated with 178 organizations.
How Attackers Turned Trusted Website Scripts Into Crypto Theft Tools
The attackers exploited a weakness in the registration process for Optimizely Web Experimentation, a platform companies use to test website designs and personalize content.
Rather than compromising each website separately, they inserted malicious JavaScript into customer projects. The modified files were subsequently delivered through Optimizely’s legitimate infrastructure, making the attack difficult to distinguish from ordinary website activity.
Helme explained the underlying problem in his technical report:
“A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.”
The injected malware contained several components. One was a cryptocurrency clipper designed to detect wallet addresses and replace them with addresses controlled by the attackers.
Its targets included Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Litecoin, Tron and other networks. The script could manipulate addresses displayed on websites, copied to clipboards or transmitted through browser functions.
A user copying a legitimate Bitcoin payment address could therefore end up transferring funds to an attacker-controlled wallet.
The malware also included a payment card skimmer capable of collecting card numbers, expiration dates and security codes entered into accessible website forms. Other functions attempted to capture browser cookies and screenshots.
For iPhone and iPad visitors, the attackers deployed additional components associated with the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, targeting different versions of Apple’s mobile operating system.
The attack did not require visitors to follow a phishing link. Loading a legitimate website containing the compromised script could expose them to the malicious code.
Bitcoin Transactions Traced as Optimizely Removes Malicious Code
Blockchain records examined by Report URI showed approximately $7,000 in cryptocurrency transactions associated with the identified attacker wallets during the initial investigation.
A November 17 update identified roughly 0.08528 BTC, worth approximately $5,489, received by one Bitcoin address. Litecoin, Tron, Ethereum and stablecoin transactions were also recorded.
These figures do not establish the amount stolen specifically through OPTIMJACK. Some identified wallets had been active before November 16, making it difficult to attribute every transaction to this incident.
The distinction matters in cryptocurrency investigations. As Ravel previously examined in its analysis of a $30 million Lazarus-linked Bitcoin wallet trail, blockchain records can establish asset movements without necessarily identifying everyone responsible for them.
Optimizely subsequently confirmed the security incident to BleepingComputer.
The company said:
“We have blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. We have removed the injected code from affected projects.”
It also terminated active sessions, revoked access tokens and notified affected customers.
Report URI’s updated investigation stated that all identified infected Optimizely files had been cleaned by 23:11 UTC on November 16.
Meanwhile, Reuters reported that Salesforce had disabled affected scripts while investigating. Equifax said it had found no evidence that its own systems were compromised, while IKEA was assessing any potential impact on its services and customers.
The presence of malicious code on Ledger’s website does not prove that attackers exposed hardware wallet private keys. The attack primarily targeted information and activity within visitors’ browsers.
For cryptocurrency holders, the recipient address displayed on a hardware wallet’s own screen remains an important verification point before signing a transaction.
This distinction between compromised web infrastructure and actual signing authority has also featured in Ravel’s investigation of the $950,000 Bloom trading bot wallet attack.
Report URI additionally found that restrictive browser content security policies blocked the malicious payload on 24 organizations’ websites in its security-policy assessment. Another 17 allowed the code to execute but restricted data transmission to the attackers.
Investigators have not established how many payment cards, browser sessions or iOS devices were ultimately compromised.


